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INTRODUCTION
Several researchers in social psychology have suggested a close
relationship between affect (the individual's like or dislike of an
object, concept, or act), beliefs (the cognitive structure representing
bits of information related to that object, concept, or act), and
behavioral intention (the tendency to respond to the object, concept, or
act by approaching or avoiding it). Rosenberg (1956, i960) , for example,
hypothesized that affect is a function of beliefs related to the perceived
instrumentality of an object or concept in attaining or blocking a set
of relevant valued states, weighted by the relative importances of those
valued states. Fishbein (1967), based on Dulany's (I96B) theory of
propositional control, considers behavioral intention to be a function
of two factors: (l) attitude toward a specific act defined in terras of
beliefs about the consequences of performing that act, weighted by the
evaluation of those beliefs, and (2) social and personal normative
beliefs, weighted by motivation to comply. The reader is referred to
Fishbein (1966), McGuire (1969), and Scheibe (1970) for reviews of
different viewpoints.
The underlying objective of all these theories and propositions
is to search for some invariant linkage among the three broad areas of
psychology that deal with cognitions, affect, and conations (Krech,
Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962). Unfortunately, this quest for an
University of Illinois
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invariant relationship is still unattained due to a number of factors:
1. Although extensive theoretical thinking is available, there
are relatively few studies.
2. Whatever studies have been carried out have suffered from a
number of methodological and analytical limitations.
3. Most studies have been conducted in the controlled environment
of the laboratory, which makes substantive inferences to the naturalistic
environment difficult.
U. Finally, and probably most important, the linkage between
attitude or behavioral intention and actual behavior has been found to
be elusive even in laboratory settings. This has generated a great deal
of pessimism about attitude's power to predict subsequent behavior.
(insko, 1967). Worse yet, others have proposed that the causality may
be in the opposite direction: attitudes may indeed be determined by the
behavior that precedes the formation and, more important, the change
in attitude structure (Cohen, I96U; Festinger, I96U) . It seems that we
need more realistic theories of attitudes as predictors of behavior in
which situational factors are consciously taken into account as mediators
between attitude and behavior. Rokeach (1968) has, for example, emphasized
the situational aspects in his distinction between attitude-toward-the-
object and attitude-toward-the-situation.
There are two major objectives of this paper:
1. To present a conceptual framework that links cognitive, conative,
and affective aspects in a more realistic and comprehensive manner.
In particular, it attempts to isolate situational factors that systemat
intervene between attitude and behavior.
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2. To report a large-scale field study that (a) investigates the
structure of attitude components, (b) causally relates attitude
with behavior, and (c) provides some operational measures of
situational factors.
A THEORY OF ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP
Based on the thinking of several researchers, notably Rosenberg
(1956, i960), D. Katz (i960), Dulany (1968), and Fishbein (1967), I have
attempted in Figure 13.1 to develop a conceptual framework of the structure
of attitudes and the attitude -behavior relationship. This section
describes the conceptual framework.
1. Total Beliefs
At a point in time, it is hypothesized that an individual has a set
of beliefs about an object or concept. These are his Total Beliefs (TB).
They constitute both the denotative and connotative meanings of the
object or concept, if we look at it from the psycholinguistic viewpoint
(Carroll, 1964; Osgood, 1962). Thus, Total Beliefs consist of the
descriptive, evaluative, and normative knowledge that the individual
possesses about the concept or object. The Total Beliefs can be
classified into the following six types based on Fishbein 's thinking
(1967, p. 259):
A. Descriptive Beliefs
1. Beliefs about the component parts of the object.
2. Beliefs about the object's relation with other objects.
3. Beliefs about the characteristics, qualities, or attributes
of the obrjact.
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B. Evaluative Beliefs
k. Beliefs about whether the object will lead to or block
the attainment of various goals or valued states.
C. Normative Beliefs
5. Beliefs about what should be done with respect to the object.
6. Beliefs about what the object should, or should not, be
allowed to do.
Alternatively, we can think of Total Beliefs as a belief system
serving all the four functions suggested by D. Katz (i960). The descriptive
beliefs serve the knowledge function, the evaluative beliefs serve the
instrumental, utilitarian function, and the normative beliefs serve the
ego-defensive as well as the value -expression function.
Total Beliefs are learned by the individual from both informational
sources and personal experiences. The former has been the major area of
research among the mass communications researchers such as the Yale group
of experimental psychologists (e.g., Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953)
and the Columbia group of survey sociologists (e.g., E. Katz and Lazarsfeld
1955)- The latter, consisting of cognitive restructuring that arises
from behavioral consequences, has been the major thrust of the dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957; Brehm and Cohen, 19&2) as well as among the
cognitive psychologists who have relied on the learning theory (Doob, 19*+7;
Fishbein, 1967; Osgood, 1957; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957; Staats,
1967; Rhine, 1958). In Figure 13.1, the dynamics of the interdependent
relationship between behavior and the cognitive world is incorporated in
the feedback loop.
2. Evaluative Beliefs
Evaluative Beliefs (EB) , by definition, are an element of Total Beliefs.
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They refer to those cognitions about an object that portray the connotative
meaning and knowledge about the object as the goal-object. In other words,
Evaluative Beliefs represent the potential of the object to satisfy a set
of relevant motives. Evaluative Beliefs as defined here are, therefore,
equivalent to the perceived instrumentality component of Rosenberg's (i960)
theory of attitude structure. Similarly, the belief structure underlying
N. E. Miller's (1959) approach-avoidance gradients would constitute Evaluative
Beliefs. Finally, Howard and Sheth (1969) consider Evaluative Beliefs to
be the profile of assessment of an object relative to competing objects on
a set of choice criteria.
Evaluative Beliefs are the primary determinants of the individual's
affective reactions toward an object or concept. In other words, a person
has a favorable -unfavorable, like-dislike, love-hate, or good-bad reaction
toward an object or concept because of the connotative meaning of that object
as a relevant or salient instrument of satisfying some motive. We are here
ignoring the development of those affective tendencies due soley to habit
or conditioning as suggested by, for example, D. Katz and Stotland (1959)*
Later we shall incorporate affective tendencies both with and without a
cognitive structure.
Evaluative Beliefs are likely to vary in both complexity and intensity
from object to object. Furthermore, it is presumed that in repetitive
goal-directed behaviors, the structure of Evaluative Beliefs becomes more
streamlined and stable as learning of the behavior becomes greater.
Evaluative Beliefs are, however, at least multivariate (several distinct
although interrelated cognitions) with some fundamental underlying
multidimensional structure.

3. Affect
Affect (A) represents the positive or negative predisposition toward
the object as a goal-object. To that excent, affective tendencies not
anchored to the goal-at-oaining or blocKing properties of the object are
ignored here. Affect as defined here is, therefore, close to the classic
definition of attitude as "a disposition to evaluate certain objects,
actions, and situations in certain ways [Chein, I9A8]."
As stated earlier, Affect is a function of Evaluative Beliefs.
However, I also believe that affective tendency exists without a structure
of Evaluative Beliefs because it is likely to be determined by the habit or
conditioning process (H). Affective tendency is likely to be especially
common among infants and young children.
Affect is likely to be determined differentially by each Evaluative
Belief. It is, therefore s possible to examine the structure of Evaluative
Beliefs in terms of the degree to which each Evaluative Belief, relative
to others, governs affective tendency. I presume that only a handful of
Evaluative Beliefs typically determine and, therefore, correlate with
Affect, even though theoretically one can find a large number of "salient"
Evaluative Beliefs. This phenomenon can be partly explained in terms of
George Miller's (195&) theory of "The Magical Number Seven." Another
point to keep in mind is the possibility that there may be individual
differences in regards to whether Evaluative Beliefs are greater or lesser
determinants of affective tendency.
Affect is presumed to be univariate and unidimensional, although we
should realize that there is a complex cognitive structure underlying it.
The algebraic function of Affect is stated as
Aij = f (EBiJk , Hij) (1)

where Ai ^ = individual i's affect toward object j,
EBi-jk = individual i's kth evaluative belief about the object j, and
Hji = habit or conditioning toward object j.
The above general equation can be made more explicit in a specific
investigation by determining a priori a finite number of criteria that
the individual utilizes to evaluate the object or concept as the goal-
object. However, we often lack such a priori judgment, in which case we
must rely on the empirical findings regarding which Evaluative Beliefs
correlate with Affect.
It is also possible to think that each Evaluative Belief partially
and incrementally contributes toward a fuller determination of Affect.
Furthermore, Evaluative Beliefs may be positively or negatively related
to Affect because most choice situations tend to be of the approach-avoidance
type: the goal-object both attains and blocks a set of motives or goals
underlying the choice criteria. To bring these things into focus, we can
reformulate the above equation in terms of a linear additive model:
Aij biCEBiij] + b2[EB2i j] +...+ bn[EBnij ] + bn+1LHij] (2)
In formulating this linear additive model, I am departing from the
standard thinking in social psychology (e.g., Fishbein, 19&7; Rosenberg,
i960) of summing the beliefs to produce a univariate attitude score,
which is then correlated with Affect, I have found elsewhere (Sheth,
1973) that this prior summing of beliefs consistently lowers the correlation
between Evaluative Beliefs and Affect. In addition, we can give at least
the following arguments against the summing of beliefs:
1. There is no reason why we should not expect the individual
to retain a profile of his beliefs rather than a sum score. Most evidenc

in the literature on information processing would support the argument
that the individual distinctly retains or files his beliefs about the
object
2. Beliefs are typically measured on a bipolar scale; therefore,
summing them entails a compromise (average) value that may be nothing
more than a statistical artifact
3. Beliefs can be positive or negative. Summing them presumes
that one cancels out the other. Another major difference is the
explicit possibility of Affect being present in some situations without
a cognitive structure. Such a possibility was first systematically
suggested by D. Katz and Stotland (1959) and amplified by Triandis
(1971).
k. Behavioral Intention
Behavioral Intention (Bx) refers to the plan or commitment of the
individual expressed at time t about how likely he is to behave in a
specific way toward the object or concept at time t+1. We must remember
that the individual can behave in many different ways with respect to an
object or concept; however, we sre primarily concerned here with his behavior
that treats the object or concept as the goal-object. In other words, we
are concerned with that behavior toward the object or concept which will
lead to attaining or blocking a set of motives or goals.
Behavioral Intention is hypothesized to be a function of (l) Evaluative
Beliefs about the object and, therefore, also Affect toward the object;
(2) the Social Environment (SE) that surrounds the individual and normatively
guides his behavior regarding what he should and should not do; and (3) the
Anticipated Situation (AS), which includes those situational factors related

to behavior that he could anticipate and, therefore, forecast at the
time of expressing his plan or commitment.
Implicitly, therefore, Behavioral Intention is a qualified
expression of behavior: given such and such environment and other
contingencies to happen at t+1, when behavior is likely to be manifested,
the individual estimates at t whether he would or would not behave.
This is important to emphasize because it is possible that we may predict
Behavioral Intention very well but not the actual behavior since (l)
anticipated social and situational factors may change and, therefore,
behavior may not materialize as planned or forecasted, and (2) other
unanticipated factors may impinge on behavior in a manner considerably
deviant from the individual's plan.
Evidently, the influence of anticipated and unanticipated social
and situational factors can be minimized if the time interval between
Behavioral Intention and actual behavior is reduced. Theoretically, we
can produce a very high positive correlation between Behavioral Intention
and actual behavior if the two are measured contiguously in time and space
because then we allow no freedom for outside factors to intervene and mediate,
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Algebraically, we can write the following function of Behavioral
Intention:
«U = f ^U*,
1
SEiJ, AS ij> (3)
where BI^
n
-= individual i's plan to behave in a certain way toward object j,
EBjjk = individual i's belief k about object j,
SE-y = individual i ' s Social Environment impinging on his behavior
toward j , and
AS^j = individual i's anticipation of events at the time of his behavior
toward j.
It is possible that the three factors (EB, SE, and AS) may act as
opposing forces resulting in some sort of conflict. For example, an
individual may very much like to buy and use a Rolls Royce but he cannot
afford it; or he may like a Cadillac and can afford it, but his social
environment may inhibit him because a Cadillac may be socially unacceptable
as a goal-object. In consumer psychology, it is common among working
housewives to find such a conflict toward many convenience (instant) foods.
Reciprocally, it is also possible for the three factors additively to
contribute or facilitate the qualified expression of behavior. Perhaps
it is more common to find this facilitating or supportive role.
We can express the facilitating or inhibiting relationship among the
three factors with respect to the determination of Behavioral Intention by
writing the general equation as a linear additive model:
BIij = bl O^ijkJ1 + b2^SEijJ + b3LAS itJ ] (h)
It should, however, be pointed out that the above model is simply
a hypothesis that should be tested because we do not know how the three
1. It is possible to use Affect as a surrogate for Evaluative Beliefs
since it is determined by the latter. In fact, in those situations where
Affect is primarily determined by conditioning, it may be superior to
Evaluative Beliefs as a predictor variable.
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factors interact with one another.
5. Social Environment
Social Environment (SE) includes all the social factors that are
likely to impinge on and provide a set of normative beliefs to the individual
about how he should behave toward the object or concept at time t+1. Most
of these social factors are likely to be anchored to the demographic,
socioeconomic, and role-oriented images of the object or concept. For
example, the individual may have the image of hair spray as a feminine
product, concentrated in lower socioeconomic class and clerical workers.
In consumer psychology, we think the following specific factors and their
categorizations may be relevant: (1) sex, (2) age, (3) education, (U)
occupational styles, (5) wealth, (6) life cycle, (7) family orientation,
and (8) life styles. This list is by no means exhaustive, nor is it
postulated that all the factors are impinging on a specific behavior.
Indeed, it would be suggested that beliefs about the influence of the
Social Environment should be empirically determined for each situation
under investigation. However, Soci Lronment clearly includes a brand's
stereotype
.
6. Anticipated Situation
The Anticipated Situation (A! iludes all the other activities
that the individual is likely to engage in at the time of actual future
behavior as he perceives and foreci v when expressing his plan
or intention to behave. Thesi ents may either enhance or
inhibit the Behavioral Intention as determined by Affect or Social Environment
or both. For example, because of a planned move to a large metropolitan
area, the individual may commit himself to riding on the mass transit system
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:ven though he dislikes it and his social environment is neutral to the
situation. Similarly, the individual may desire a new personal luxury
iar and his social environment may also support this desire, but the financial
jonstraints as projected to the next one or two years inhibit his intention
;o buy it.
The Anticipated Situation factor is presumed to be much more situation
)Ound and ad hoc than the Social Environment factor. Accordingly, it is
revy difficult to develop an invariant list of variables as indicators of
;he Anticipated Situation factor. Once again, we must empirically determine
;he presence or absence of this factor in each investigation. However,
msed on some existing empirical evidence, it is possible to list the
following general causes that lead to the presence of Anticipated Situation
affecting the neat relationship between Evaluative Beliefs or Affect and
3ehavioral Intention: (l) cyclical phenomena such as holidays, vacations,
Dirthdays, schooling, and education; (2) anticipated mobility (in view of
bhe fact that mobility is very prevalent and increasing, a number of buying
iecisions may be strictly due factor) ; and (3) financial status
of the decision maker, including anl id incomes and expenditures.
7. Behavior
Behavior (B) refers to a spe ct under investigation that is
manifested at a spec i and under a specific situation. For example,
in the buyer behavior area irchase of a brand of television
set from a particular store on Lcular day. We are, therefore, not
interested in predicting some generalized behavior that has no situational
influences. For example, brand loyalty of the individual in buyer behavior,
measured either by actual observations of repeat patterns of purchases or by
a verbal self-reporting scale, is likely to be a generalized act in which
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situational influences at each purchase occasion are ignored or at least
deemphasized.
Behavior is hypothesized to be a function of the individual's Affect
(with or without cognitive structure), Behavioral Intention, and a set
of Unexpected Events (UE) that impinge on Behavior and that the individual
could not predict at the time of verbally expressing his Behavioral Intention.
By definition, if Affect and Behavioral Intention were expressed just prior
to the act of behavior, we would be likely to find an absence of the
Unexpected Events factor. Thus, in most laboratory experimental studies, both
Affect and Behavioral Intention may be treated as equivalent to Behavior
because they are expressed contiguously to Behavior both in time and space
so that there are very few nonpredictable or unexpected events that deviate
Behavior from the verbally expressed Behavioral Intention. However, in
the naturalistic settings of the real world, we must expect a lack of
contiguity between Behavioral Intention and Behavior due to the problems
of data collection. This enables the Unexpected Events factor to exert
an influence on Behavior. The greater the lack of contiguity in time and
space, the greater should be the opportunity for the Behavior to be also
indluenced by the Unexpected Events factor. In buyer behavior, considerable
empirical evidence exists in the area of durable appliances to support
this hypothesis.
Mathematically, we can state that
Bijt = f <AiJ, t-n, BIij,t-n, «Ei3t ) (5)
where B^^ = a specific act of behavior manifested by individual i at
time t toward object j
;
Aii t-n
= Affect toward the object (with or without cognitive structure),
expressed at time t-n;
Bl-ji t _n = individual i's plan to behave in a certain way toward object,
as expressed at some time interval n, prior to actual behavior;
and
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UE.,^ = Unexpected Events experienced by individual i at the time
of behavior t toward object j.
We also presume that Affect and Behavioral Intention are uncorrelated
with Unexpected Events and that Unexpected Events can either enhance or
inhibit the conversion of Affect and Behavioral Intention into actual
Behavior. Under these assumptions, the following linear additive model
can be established:
B ijt = b l^ij,t-n3+ b 2 [BI ijt:t „ n ] + b3 [UEijt ] (6)
It is my belief that the reason for the failure of attitudes (Affect
or Behavioral Intention) to predict subsequent Behavior is primarily due
to the presence and influence of the Unexpected Events factor and not
simply due to the problems of definition and measurement as suggested in
social psychology.
The above model also provides an explanation for habitual behavior
based on conditioning, reasoning (intentional behavior), and unplanned
or random behavior. Therefore, i<: allows for the possibility of behavior
being determined both by a plan and by random events.
8. Unexpected Events
The Unexpected Events (HE) factor refers to the antecedent and
contiguous stimuli that impinge on the individual at the time of the
behavior under investigation. In other words, it refers to the situational
environment surrounding the specific act of behavior. In buyer behavior,
the Unexpected Events factor can be illustrated by the announcement of
the sale of a competing brand in the supermarket, which influences the
purchase plan of the housewife. It is my contention that in buying
behavior, the influence of Unexpected Events is very much underrepresented
because of our zeal to give some rational explanation for all behavior.
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In other words, in buyer behavior we have based our thinking on the
assumption that all buying decisions are intentional behavior. We all
know very well that this is not the cat>e. It is, therefore, critical
to examine more fully the nature and typology of the Unexpected Events
factor. Some research has already been directed toward this under the
rubric of impulse purchase behavior, novelty seeking, and venturesomeness
of the buyer.
CANONICAL CORRELATIONS FORMULATION
In the preceding section, I have described the conceptual model
of the structure of attitudes and the attitude-behavior relationship. We
may test each of the linkages in the model by simply obtaining relevant
data for each of the equations in the preceding section (see Sheth, 1971).
However, it is obvious that the conceptual theory has a set of constructs
which are in a sequential form so that a given construct both is determined
by other constructs and determines some other constructs. This enables us
to use the method of canonical correlations to test simultaneously all
the relationships proposed in the theory. The rationale is developed
below.
In Figure 13.1, Behavior (B) is a function of Affect (A), Behavioral
Intention (BI) , and Unexpected Events (UE) . Thus,
B = f (A, BI, UE) (7)
Behavioral Intention (BI) itself is a function of Evaluative Beliefs
(EB) , Anticipated Situation (AS), and Social Environment (SE) . Hence,
BI = g (EB, AS, SE) (8)
Finally, Affect (A) is a function of a set of Evaluative Beliefs (EB)
.
Therefore,
A = h (EB. k = 1, 2, ...n) ( 9 )
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It is obvious that Evaluative Beliefs are central both to the
understanding of various dimensions of attitude structure and to the
prediction of behavior. If we assume that all the above functions are
at least monotonic and probably also linear, it is possible to set up a
canonical correlation function in which B, BI , and A are all simultaneously
a function of the set of Evaluative Beliefs. Thus,
(B, BI, A) = p (EBj_ EB2 ... EBn ) (10)
In view of the fact that SE, AS, and UE are also determinants of BI
and B but not of A, it is logical to assume that Evaluative Beliefs will
predict Affect much better than they will predict Behavioral Intention,
and that they will predict the latter better than they will predict
Behavior. In order to see the difference in predictive power, we can set
up another canonical correlation function that includes these environmental
factors. Therefore,
(B, BI, A) = f (EB
X
EB 2 . . . EBn SE, AS, UE) (11)
The above equation represents a full test of the conceptual theory.
In order now to include the individual differences and lack of contiguity
between behavior and attitudes, this ec lation can be made specific to an
individual i behaving toward an object j at time t:
< Bijt, BI ij,t-n, A ij,t-n> = f (Eb lij,t-n, EB2ij,t-n,
••• EBnij,t-n, SEij jt -n, AS ij>t-n, ™ t}J (12)
The canonical function in equation (12) represents a full test of the model.
DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
The empirical investigation of the relationships among beliefs,
affect, behavioral intention, and behavior is based on data collected in
a large-scale study that attempted to test the Howard-Sheth (1969) theory
of buyer behavior. The theory of buyer behavior provides a description
and explanation of the consumer's brand choice process and the development
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of brand loyalty over time. At the core of the theory is the concept of
expectancy developed primarily by the process of learning from informational
and experiential sources.
Based on standard probability sampling procedures, a longitudinal
panel of 954 housewives was established. The panel members recorded in
diaries their purchases of several convenience food products, including
instant breakfast, for a period of five months beginning in May and ending
in October, 1966. In addition to recording their buying behavior, including
the place of purchase, the time, the amount, and the price of the products,
the panel members were interviewed four times. The first time involved a
mail questionnaire sent out at the time of recruiting, which asked information
on such things as the housewife's home involvement, her family's breakfast
eating habits, and her attitudes and opinions on several milk additive
products including instant breakfast. One month later, a telephone interview
was conducted in which information was obtained on her awareness, knowledge,
preference, and intentions re; three brands of instant breakfast.
Two of these brands were ne roduced t • rket soon after the
recruitment and establish:: tl the Irand was
well known because it had least two years prior
to the study. The sec also conducted by
telephone and essentially obtained as the first telephone
interview.
The data relevant to this stud', pi a well-known brand of
instant breakfast, which we shall call GIB. The object in question is,
therefore, a brand of instant breakfast, and this investigation examines
the interrelationships among Evaluative Beliefs, Affect, Buying Intention,
and buying Behavior toward the CIB brand of instant breakfast. The
attitudinal data utilized in this study came from the mail questionnaire
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and che first two telephone interviews. The behavioral data came from the
recorded diaries.
The following. are the operational definitions of Affect, Buying
Intention, Evaluative Beliefs, buying Behavior, Social Environment,
Anticipated Situation, and Unexpected Events.
1. Affect (A) --Overall like or dislike of a brand of instant breakfast
at the time of interview. The specific rating scale used was the
following:
In general, I In general I
like it veryQ don,t Uke ic
much
2. Buying Intention (BI) --Verbal expression of intent to buy the brand
of instant breakfast within some specified time period from the
time of interview. The particular scale used was the following:
How likely are you to buy in the next month?
j Definitely will
1 j
Probably will
j Not sure on way or the other
j
Probably will not
j
Definitely will not
3- Evaluative Beliefs (I Luation of a brand of instant breakfast
in terms of certain characteristics that are anchored to blocking
or actaining a set of valued states or choice criteria. A total
of seven Evaluative B< ere obtained from the respondent about
each of the three brands of instant breakfast during each of the
three telephone interviews. The particular characteristics of the
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brands and the associated criteria of choice were based on a
prior depth-interviewing of 100 housewives on milk additive
products including instant br akfast. The seven Evaluative
Beliefs about a brand were obtained by the following bipolar
rating scales:
Delicious tasting
j ZD Not delicious tasting
Good substitute for £ ^] Poor substitute for
meal rneal
Very nutritious [_ J Somewhat nutritious
Very good for a Qj £Z] [ZZ! LZj LJ uZ3 CZ3 Not §ood for a
snack snack
Very filling CZ! NoC very filling
Good buy for the \_ J Not a good buy for
money the money
Good source of {_ j Poor source of
protein protein
4. Behavior (B) --Purchase: of a brand of instant breakfast during
the five months of panel operation was the specific act of
behavior under investigation. 1 c was operationally measured
from the reported purchases of a brand of instant breakfast
as recorded in th< chat pant LI led cut every
two weeks. e used in this study. One
was the number of purchases of a brand between two telephone
interviews; the other was a classitactory measure of buying at
least once or at all. 1 latter is utilized in the
canonical function tested in the next section.
5. Social Environment (SE) - -Social normative beliefs about the
appropriateness of buying and consuming instant breakfast. These
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normative beliefs were obtained from a projective-type question
in which respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the
following characterizations of persons who consume instant
breakfast:
(a) people who are health conscious
(b) people who have a health problem
(c) people who want quick energy
(d) people who are in a hurry at meals
(e) people who like snacks
(f) people who are lazy
(g) people who don't like breakfast
6. Anticipated Situation (AS)--Those anticipated situational factors
that are likely to impinge on the purchase of C1B. Howard and
Sheth (1969, chap. 4) present a number of "inhibitors" that
presumably dampen a buyer's affect in expressing behavioral
intention. The following factors were extracted from the mail
questionnaire as indicators of AS:
(a) Budget determines what we eat
(b) Do check prices of food items
(c) Differences in price among brands are interesting to
compare
(d) Go to other stores for sale items
7. Unexpected Events (UE)- -Those situational factors impinging on the
purchase of CIB that the respondent could not anticipate or forecast.
The factors were obtained by direct questioning of the respondent if
she did not buy CIB although she expressed an intention to buy it.
Two such factors were used in this study:
(a) Tried to buy, but CIB wasn't available
(b) Number of hours per week the housewife works
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It must be pointed out that while the operational definitions
of B, BI, A, EB,and SE seem quite satisfactory, those of AS and UE
are probably not fully exhaustive. To that extent, the study
suffers from weak data. However, it should also be kept in mind
that both AS and UE are very much situation bound and mostly
empirical. They are, therefore, most difficult to observe and
measure
.
There seem to be several advantages in using data from this
large-scale, naturalistic study compared to several experimental
studies found in social psychology. These advantages are as
follows
:
1. The study was conducted in naturalistic environment that
dealt with a real situation. It was conducted in cooperation
with a large grocery company that was test marketing one of
the brands of instant breakfast. It thus reduced the burden
of substantive and statistical inference from a simulated
laboratory-type situation to reality. In short, many of the
differences that Hovland (1959) pointed out between
experimental and survey findings are absent here.
2. The sample size of this study was large enough to put
statistical faith in the findings. In addition, the sample
was based on standard probability sampling procedures.
3. Due to the cooperation of the company, a unique situation
was created in which beliefs, affect, and behavioral intention
preceded actual behavior since the product was not even
introduced to the market at the time of the first interview
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and, therefore, no one could buy it.
k. This was a longitudinal study in which we could use time
as a factor to build the direction of causation between
attitude and behavior. It was, therefore, possible to
measure prior attitudes for predicting subsequent behavior
and also use prior behavior as a predictor of subsequent
attitudes.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The model presented earlier was tested in two stages. The first
stage consisted of the canonical correlation of Affect, Behavioral Intention,
and Behavior only on Evaluative Beliefs. This was done primarily to
examine the relative predictive power of Evaluative Beliefs across three
criterion variables. The model appropriate for this stage of the analysis
is, therefore, given in equation (10).
Three separate canonical analyses were performed by utilizing
measurements of (l) Evaluative Beliefs, Affect, and Behavioral Intention
from the mail questionnaire and the first two telephone interviews, and
(2) Purchase Behavior from the biweekly diary records between the mail
questionnaire and the first telephone interview, between the first and
the second telephone interviews, and finally between the second and the last
telephone interviews.
If the conceptual theory and the mathematical models are correct,
from a set of Evaluative Beliefs we should expect to predict Affect best,
Behavioral Intention less well, and Purchase Behavior even less well. This
is because Behavioral Intention is also governed by other factors and Behavior
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is governed by still one more factor, as shown in Figure 13.1.
Results of the canonical analysis are presented in Table 13.1. The
first two canonical correlations were frvund to be significant at least
at the 5-percent level and, therefore, they are retained for interpretation
and discussion. However, the canonical correlation of the second linear
compound is only around 0.200 and explains only about 5 percent of the
additional variance in the criterion set. Therefore, it obtains its
significance status primarily due to the large number of degrees of freedom
that result in the chance expectation of near-zero canonical correlation.
Examination of the variance explained in each of the criterion variables
pretty much confirms the expectations of the model. The variance in Affect
is explained the most (between 53 and 65 percent), in Behavioral Intention
the second most (between 32 and 37 percent), and in Purchase Behavior the
least (between 8 and 10 percent). The extreme drop in the ability of
Evaluative Beliefs to predict Parchase Behavior simply confirms the findings
of other studies conducted in naturalistic settings regarding the limitation
of attitudes to predict subsequent behavior. Evidently, a lot of Unexpected
Events or random factors vitiate the presumed neat attitude -behavior relationship
so popular in experimental and social psychology.
Another aspect of interest in the canonical analysis is the structure
of the relationship between the predictor and the criterion variables. In
other words, which Evaluative Beliefs are more salient as determinants of
Affect, Behavioral Intention, and Behavior? Do the same Evaluative Beliefs
have equal saliency for the prediction of ail the three dependent variables
or is there a classification (typology) of beliefs so that some are
determinants of Affect, others of Behavioral Intention, and still others
of Purchase Behavior? According to the theory presented in Figure 13.
1
5 we

-2k-
should expect some beliefs to determine Affect and others to determine
Behavioral Intention, but both types of beliefs to determine Behavior by
beind mediated through either Affect or Behavioral Intention.
In order to examine the typology or structure we need two things.
First, the Evaluative Beliefs must be uncorrelated in order to avoid the
problem of multicollinearity. Fortunately, this was very true in our
data since we had eliminated six other Evaluative Beliefs, such as flavor,
reasonable price, and calories, based on the high intercorrelations with
the seven beliefs kept in the analysis. Second, the canonical axes solution
suffers from the same problem of lack of invariance as does factor analysis
or discriminant analysis because all are special cases of each other and
utilize the same theory of characteristic equations. The only difference
among these three multivariate methods is the manner in which the researcher
partitions his data matrix. In factor analysis, the variance -covariance
of the total matrix is maximized; in discriminant analysis, the sampling
observations are partitioned into mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups
based on some theory of group differences; and in canonical correlation
analysis, the variables are partitioned into two or more groups based on
some theory of the structure of variable relationships. In all of these
methods, we need to utilize some principles of b that will enable
the researcher to choose the one set of canonical coefficients that is most
meaningful from a certain viewpoint. These judgments are Thurstone's
principles of simple structure for rotating axes in such a way as to bring
out in bold relief the structure of relationships among variables. Accordingly,
a rotation was performed on the canonical analysis results given in Tab3.e 13.1
with the use of orthogonal varimax rotation.
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The rotated canonical coefficents are presented in Table 13.2. An
examination of the large coefficients in that table suggests that Affect
was primarily determined by "taste" and somewhat by "protein source"
and "filling quality of the instant breakfast." On the other hand, Behavioral
Intention and to some extent Purchase Behavior were primarily determined by
"good buy" and "meal substitute" and somewhat by "nutritious" and "filling
quality of the instant breakfast." Finally, Affect lies in one domain of
the two dimensional space and Behavioral Intention and Purchase Behavior
lie in some other domain. In other words, if Affect and Behavioral Intention
were themselves to be used as predictors of Purchase Behavior, Behavioral
Intention would prove a better predictor than Affect. This is also expected
from the model presented earlier in the paper*
A final point to discuss is the role of feedback from Purchase Behavior
in the development of habit or conditioning. As the consumer buys the
product, he should develop some conditioning effects that must as least
strengthen the relationship of Affect and Behavioral Intention with Evaluative
Beliefs. We see this from the slight increase in the explained variance in
the second telephone interview as competed to the mail questionnaire*
Having examined the magnitude ana structure of the relationship between
Evaluative Beliefs and Affect, Behavioral Intention, and Purchase Behavior,
let us test the full model presented in Figure 13.1 and equation (12). We
should expect an increase in the explained variance of the criterion set
by including variables related to Social Environment, Anticipated Situation,
and Unexpected Events. Furthermore, the increase in the explained variance
should come primarily in Behavioral Intention and Purchase Behavior since
these are all directly related to the three added factors. In short,
the variance explained in Affect should remain unchanged but the explained
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variance should increase in Behavioral Intention or Behavior or both depending
on the impact of the three factors.
A second set of canonical analyses was performed on a smaller set of
individuals in which the criterion set remained the same but the predictor
set now consisted of Evaluative Beliefs, Social Environment, Anticipated
Situation, and Unexpected Events. The results are summarized in Table 13.3.
All the three canonical axes were significant at least at the 5-percent level
even though the last canonical correlation hovered around 0.200 and the
additional variance explained by the third canonical axis was only around
5 percent. Once again the significance was achieved due to the large number
of degrees of freedom in the data.
As can be seen from the explained variances of each of the criterion
variables, the variance explained in Affect remained virtually the same
despite the additional predictor variables included in the analysis. This
is clearly a very good support for part of the full model specified in
Figure 13.1. The amount of variance explained in Behavioral Intention jumped
somewhat so that the additional variables contributed toward an increase of
about 10 perct variance. Thus, Behavioral Intention's
variance changed from arou valuative Beliefs alone to
around ii5 percent with the
Finally, the variance i or jumped considerably
with the utilization oi' the full model. From an average of about 9 percent
with Evaluative Beliefs alone, the explained variance is around 2k percent
with the additional variab3.es.
In order to examine the source and structure of covariances with the
predictor variables, the canonical axes were rotated with the use of
orthogonal varimax rotation. The rotated canonical coefficients are given
in Table 13.4. Examination of the third canonical axis on which Affect
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loads heavily shows that none of the additional variables relate significantly
to Affect through it. This is what we should expect if the full model is
correctly specified.
Examination of the canonical axis on which Behavioral Intention loads
heavily reveals that a number of variables from the Social Environment and
Anticipated Situation factors are loaded on it. These include "lazy,"
"have health problem," "like snacks," "want quick energy," and "don't
like breakfast" from the Social Environment factor, and "brand price
differences interesting" and "check food prices" from the Anticipated Situation
factor. Unfortunately, there is no stability among the three separate
analyses. This may be due to the likelihood of multicollinearity among
the variables comprising the two factors.
Finally, most of the increased variance in Purchase Behavior comes from
a single situational variable, namely, nonavailability of CIB brand of instant
breakfast. This is a dramatic example of the role of the Unexpected Events
factor in the prediction of behavior in natural settings. Unfortunately,
there are too many situational events that inhibit or precipitate actual
behavior, often contrary to the cognitive structure about the object and
the situation.
In addition, some of the variables in the Social Environment and
Anticipated Situation factors also seeni to contribute coward the prediction
of Purchase Behavior. These include "rushed at meals, 1 ' "like snacks,"
and "brand price differences interesting." All of these variables seem to be
compensatory to Evaluative Beliefs so that even a negative evaluation of
the brand is not enough to stop Purchase Behavior due to these variables.
Once again we see that the explained variance in Affect and
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Behavioral Intention improves slightly in the second telephone interview
analysis compared with the mail questionnaire analysis. This somewhat
supports the feedback aspects of the model.
It may appear from the above results that the model is supported and
validated by empirical evidence. However, this is not completely true.
In order for the model to be validated, we should have obtained a much
larger percentage in the explained variance for both Behavioral Intention
and Purchase Behavior. It should have been at least comparable to that
obtained for Affect. Why is this not the case in the study? There are
several explanations, but the most obvious and critical explanation lies
in the weaknesses of the variables chosen to measure Social Environment,
Anticipated Situation, and Unexpected Events. As stated earlier, many of
them are at best surrogates for the type of variables that comprise these
three factors in the model. A second explanation is related to the low
explained variance of Purchase Behavior. The addendum to the diary asked
the housewife to record the reasons for the discrepancy between intentions
and actual behavior. The lis hese reasons is large and specific
to each customer. The only common variable that could be isolated was the
lack of availability rand. If we had specified other reasons as binary
variables, it is certain that the model could have been considerably improved
in its empirical validation.
One last point on the validation of the model. In an attempt to relate
cognitive aspects of attitudes and the attitude -behavior relationship, this
paper has ignored the role of conditioning or habit in determining Affect
and Behavior. We need to examine carefully whether cognitively determined
Affect and Behavior or habitually determined Affect and Behavior are more
prevalent in consumer behavior. This is critical in building any control
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models from the point of view of the marketing management. The cognitively
determined attitudes a.nd behavior will suggest the usefulness of persuasive
communication as the strategy of change while the behaviorally determined
attitudes and behavior will suggest the strategy of some form of behavior
modification.
To conclude, the model of attitude structure and the attitude -behavior
relationship presented in this paper is not a definite, final viewpoint
or theory. It simply represents an advanced stage of evolutionary thinking
that began at the time of writing the Howard-Sheth theory of buyer behavior.
I hope that it will not be mistaken for a final invariant position on my part,
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Figure 13.1
A Conceptual Theory of Attitude Structure and
Attitude -Behavior Relationship
8. Unexpected
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Table 13.1
Canonical Analysis of Affect, Behavioral Intention, and
Purchase Behavior As a Function of Evaluative Beliefs
Mail Questionnaire First Teleph one Second Teleph one
Canonical Axes
Interview
(Ti)
Canonical Axes
Interview
(T2 )
Canonical Axes
I II R
2
I | II
"2
R^ I II
2
R
Criterion Set
Affect .873 - .983 .528 .806 - .935 .538 .850 - .736 .646
Behavioral Intention .166 1.239 .322 .281 1.010 .345 .237 .716 .367
Purchase Behavior .029 .124 .103 -.004 .391 .080 -.025 .682 .084
Predictor Set
Delicious tasting .617 - .653 .710 - .670 .701 - .676
Good buy .195 .678 .176 .7 54 213 .399
Meal substitute .176 .695 .121 .518 .118 .617
Snack .141 .168 .072 .190 .123 .383
Protein source .097 - .501 .082
;
-
.271 .010 .453
Filling .094 - .11 .116
|
.238 . L01 - .737
Nutritious .015 .013 .020 - .415 -.017 - .008
Canonical R .733* .236*
|
.751* .181* .818* .200*
o
Canonical R .537 .056 .564 .033 .669 .040
N=668 N=604 N=553
* Significant at .05 level
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Table 13.2
Rotated Canonical Axes of Belief Model
Criterion Set
Affect
Behavioral
Intention
Purchase Behavior
Predictor Set
Delicious tasting
Good buy
Meal substitute
Snack
Protein source
Filling
Nutritious
Mail Quest ionna
Canonical Axe
ire
s
R 2
First Telephone
Interview (Tj)
Canonical Axes
Second Telephone
Interview (T~)
Canonical Axes
I II I II R^ I II R^
1.30 - .20 .528 1.19 - .33 .538 1.11 - .18 .646
-.66 1.06 .322 - .33 1.00 .345 - .17 .73 .376
-.06 .11 .103 - .22 .32 .080 - .38 .57 .084
.89 - .11 .96 - .16 .95 - .21
-.28 .65 - .27 .72 - .03 .45
-.31 .65 - .19 .50 - .22 .59
.00 .22 - .05 .20 - .10 .39
.39 - .32 .22 - .18 - .23 .39
.14 - .02 - .04 .26 .47 - .58
.00 .02 .25 - .33 - .01 - .02
N = 668 N = 604
1
N = 553
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